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SB 1052: Miranda Rights for Minors 
Albert G. Mendoza* 
Code Sections Affected 
Welfare and Institutions Code § 625.6 (new). 
SB 1052 (Lara and Mitchell); Vetoed. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 802 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 804 
A. Federal Law and State Law ................................................................... 805 
B. Miranda Warnings ................................................................................. 805 
C. Exceptions to Miranda ........................................................................... 806 
D. Assertion of Rights ................................................................................ 807 
E. Sufficient Waiver ................................................................................... 808 
III. SB 1052 ........................................................................................................ 809 
A. Legislative Declarations and Findings ................................................. 809 
B. Mandatory Legal Consultation Before a Custodial Interrogation of 
a Minor .................................................................................................. 810 
IV. ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 810 
A. SB 1052 Would Have Allowed Emerging Developmental and 
Cognitive Science to Influence Legal Standards ................................... 811 
B. SB 1052 Would Have Ensured a Minor Meaningfully Understands 
His Miranda Rights While Allowing Law Enforcement to Effectively 
Respond to Substantial Threats ............................................................. 813 
C. SB 1052 Would Have Failed to Provide Guidance to a Court 
Determining Whether a Statement was Voluntarily, Knowingly, and 
Intelligently Made ................................................................................. 816 
1. SB 1052s Original Version Provided Guidance to Courts ............. 817 
2. Subsequent Amendments to SB 1052 Leave the Vague 
Framework Courts Have when Determining when a Statement 
is Voluntarily, Knowingly, and Intelligently Made ......................... 817 
D. SB 1052 Would Have Failed to Assist a Minor in Meeting the 
Stringent Requirement to Adequately Invoke His Rights ...................... 819 
E. SB 1052 Grants Minors a New Right, While Failing to Provide a 
Remedy .................................................................................................. 821 
2017 / Welfare and Institutions 
802 
F. SB 1052’s Veto ...................................................................................... 822 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 822 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the age of ten, Joseph shot and killed his father while he slept on the 
couch.1 Joseph suffered physical and sexual abuse, neglect, and exposure to 
“heroin, methamphetamine, LSD, marijuana and alcohol” in the womb.2 He also 
suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and exhibited a lower than 
average intelligence.3 Law enforcement later interrogated Joseph with his 
stepmother sitting beside him.4 During the custodial interview, officers advised 
Joseph of his Miranda rights,5 and he purportedly waived these rights.6 During 
his interrogation, law enforcement instructed Joseph that he had the right to 
remain silent, and when asked whether he understood what this meant, he 
answered, “Yes, that means that I have the right to stay calm.”7 Joseph failed to 
accurately state the legal significance of remaining silent8 and subsequently 
confessed to shooting and killing his father.9 The juvenile court found that Joseph 
understood the wrongfulness of his conduct and found Joseph guilty of second-
degree murder.10 In doing so, the court held that the prosecutor overcome a 
statutory presumption of incapacitation.11 Joseph was sentenced to a maximum 
confinement time of 40 years to life, and the court adjudicated him a ward.12 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2018; B.S., 
Criminal Justice, California State University of Sacramento, 2014. I would like to thank my primary editor and 
Editor-in-Chief of UPLR for their assistance, suggestions, and advice. I also want to thank my family for their 
unconditional love and unwavering confidence. Last, but never least, I’d like to thank my beautiful high school 
sweetheart, Debbie, for being the driving force behind everything I do, and for reminding me of what is truly 
important in life. 
1. In re Joseph H., 238 Cal.App.4th, 517, 522, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 171, 176 (4th Dist. 2015). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 517, 523. 
4. In re Joseph H., 200 Cal.Rptr.3d. 1, 1, 367 P.3d 1, 1 (Cal. 2015). 
5. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (stating that the Fifth Amendment provides a suspect with 
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and the right to counsult with counsel or have counsel present 
prior to or during police questioning). 
6. In re Joseph H., 200 Cal. Rptr.3d. at 1, 367 P.3d at 1. 
7. Id. at 3. 
8. Id. 
9. Id.at 1. 
10. In re Joseph H., 238 Cal.App.4th 517, 539, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 171, 190 (4th Dist. 2015). 
11. CAL. PENAL CODE §26 (West 2016) (stating that “children under the age of 14” are presumed to not 
be capable of committing crimes unless “clear proof [exists] that at the time of committing the act,” they knew 
of its wrongfulness); In re Joseph H., 188 Cal.Rptr.3d at 189–91. 
12. In Re Joseph H., 238 Cal.App.4th 517, 529, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 171, 189–91 (4th Dist. 2015).; Ward, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), Westlaw (defining ward as “[s]omeone who is housed by, and 
receives protection and necessities from, the government”). 
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Joseph is one of the 613 minors in California under the age of 12 who were 
arrested for a felony in 2011.13 In 2014, California reported that 87,000 minors 
were arrested, which accounted for a large number of the total arrests.14 
Interrogations are understood to naturally create a coercive effect and may even 
produce false confessions.15 Suspects are read their Miranda rights before an 
interrogation begins to protect a suspect from making self-incriminating 
statements and false confessions.16 Even with such warnings given at the 
beginning of an interrogation, interrogations still produce false confessions,17 and 
minors account for 35 percent of these false confessions.18 
Joseph petitioned the Supreme Court of California to review his case and 
contended that, in light of developmental and cognitive science and “what any 
person knows about children generally,” it was doubtful that Joseph understood 
his Miranda rights and the consequences that come with waiving those rights.19 
Although a majority of the Supreme Court of California denied the petition, 
Justice Goodwin Liu dissented and argued that a ten-year-old being capable of 
waiving his rights merited the court’s review.20 Justice Liu stated that Joseph’s 
case raised the question of whether “there is an age below which the concept of a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver has no meaningful application” and 
questioned the manner in which the Miranda warnings can be effectively 
conveyed to young minors.21 
Because the Supreme Court of California declined to address a minor’s 
ability to waive his Miranda rights, Justice Liu indicated that the California 
Legislature may wish to address this issue.22 Senator Lara responded to Justice 
Liu’s dissent by drafting SB 1052.23 SB 1052 sought to protect minors from  
waiving constitutional rights they do not fully understand by recognizing 
emerging developmental and cognitive science indicating that minors are 
different than adults.24 However, SB 1052 failed to protect minors who were 
 
13. Kamala D. Harris, Juvenile Justice in California, CAL. DEPT. OF JUST. REP. 56 (2011), available at 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/misc/jj11/preface.pdf (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
14. Id. at 1. 
15. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
16. Id. 
17. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. 
C. L. REV. 891, 907–08 (2004). 
18. Id. at 945 (indicating that the false confessors in the study, under the age of 18, consisted of 35% of 
those who falsely confessed). 
19. In re Joseph H., 200 Cal.Rptr.3d. 1, 4, 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015). 
20. Id. at 1. 
21. Id.at 3. 
22. Id. at 4–5. 
23. SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 4 (May 16, 2016).  
24. See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing that SB 1052 sought to protect minors from unknowingly waiving 
their constitutional rights).  
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developmentally incapable of unambiguously asserting their constitutional 
rights.25 
In recognizing emerging cognitive and developmental science regarding 
minors,26 SB 1052 would have placed procedures on law enforcement to ensure 
that a minor meaningfully understands his Miranda rights before being presented 
with the opportunity to waive them.27 Part I of this Article introduces the legal 
context before the drafting of SB 1052.28 Part II discusses the legal background 
that existed before SB 1052.29 Part III explains the changes SB 1052 would have 
created.30 Part IV analyzes the benefits and shortcomings of SB 1052.31 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
California law permits an officer to take into custody a minor without a 
warrant.32 A minor is generally treated the same as an adult when he or she is 
arrested and interrogated.33 A minor must be advised of certain constitutional 
rights if he34 is taken into custody, commonly known as the Miranda warnings.35 
For a minor to invoke his constitutional rights, the minor must unambiguously 
communicate this to law enforcement with such clarity that a reasonable officer 
under the circumstances would understand his request.36 Like an adult, a minor 
can waive his constitutional rights either expressly or implicitly.37 However, a 
 
25. See infra Part IV.E (explaining that SB 1052 would not protect minors who are developmentally 
incapable of unambiguously asserting their constitutional rights). 
26. This article refers to all individuals under the age of 18 as minors. 
27. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
28. Supra Part I. 
29. Infra Part II. 
30. Infra Part III. 
31. Infra Part IV. 
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625 (West 2016). 
33. In re Joseph H., 200 Cal.Rptr.3d. 1, 1, 367 P.3d 1, 1 (Cal. 2015). 
34. The rest of this comment will use “he” to mean either a male or female gender. 
35. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625 (requiring that “the officer shall advise such minor that 
anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to 
remain silent, his right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed 
if he is unable to afford counsel”), with Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (requiring that “[h]e must be 
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against 
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney 
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”). 
36. Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
37. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (failing to differentiate a separate standard for 
a suspect to waive their rights depending on their age); See N.C. v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (finding a 
defendant with an 11th grade education is held to the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard); People v. 
Whitson, 17 Cal.4th 229, 248, 949 P.2d 18, 28 (Cal. 1998). 
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minor’s waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made for the 
waiver to be valid and the statements admissible in court.38 
A. Federal Law and State Law 
The Supreme Court of the United States interprets the United States 
Constitution and establishes the essential constitutional requirements that a state 
must follow.39 Under the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court declared all 
evidence obtained by searches or seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution as inadmissible in a state court.40 “The purpose 
of the exclusionary rule is to deter [and] to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to 
disregard it” by making evidence acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
inadmissible in state or federal court.41 The Supreme Court evaluates whether a 
minor makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver by using the same 
standard for adults and also considering the minor’s age, intelligence, education, 
experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of making a 
statement.42 The Supreme Court of California last used an identical standard in 
People v. Lara.43 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States generally requires that 
Miranda warnings, or an equivalent notification, be provided to a suspect in 
order for statements taken in an in-custody interrogation to be admissible.44 
However, the Supreme Court sets out the minimum requirements, and each 
individual state may choose to require additional requirements or safeguards, so 
long as they provide the baseline notice mandated by the Supreme Court.45 
B. Miranda Warnings 
For law enforcement to conduct a custodial interrogation of a minor, or any 
individual, the minor generally must be notified of his rights, commonly referred 
 
38. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
39. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
41. Id. at 656. 
42. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979) (using a totality of the circumstances standard); 
People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 389 (Cal. 1967). 
43. 67 Cal.2d 365, 389 (using the totality of the circumstances standard for a minor). 
44. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
45. Id. at 467 (encouraging “Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly 
effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal 
laws”); in re Patrick W., 104 Cal.App.3d 615, 618 (2nd Dist. 1980) (stating that “although a California court 
must give to a defendant at least as full rights as the Constitution of the United States . . . a California court 
may, in applying our own state constitutional requirements, afford to a defendant rights greater than those 
required by the federal Constitution”). 
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to as Miranda warnings.46 The Miranda warnings consist of warning a minor in 
“clear and unequivocal terms” that he has the following rights: (1) to remain 
silent; (2) that anything he says can be used against him; (3) the right to an 
attorney; and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to 
him.47 There are no specific words to make a Miranda warning legally sufficient, 
rather it is only necessary that the minor be fully and unambiguously advised of 
his constitutional rights.48 For example, in People v. Bradford, a California court 
found a confession inadmissible because of the officer’s failure to give one of the 
four requirements of a Miranda warning.49 Any evidence that results from an 
unwarned, in-custody interrogation of a minor cannot be used against him in a 
criminal proceeding.50 
In addition to the Miranda warnings, California law requires that a minor, 
who is taken into a place of confinement, be advised of his right to make at least 
two telephone calls: one to a parent, guardian, responsible adult, or employer and 
one to an attorney.51 California courts are currently split regarding whether an 
officer must advise a minor that a parent is present and wishes to speak to him.52 
However, an officer does not need to obtain a parent’s consent before he can 
interrogate a minor.53 
C. Exceptions to Miranda 
Currently, a public safety exception exists to the requirement that a minor be 
advised of the Miranda warnings when he is in custody, and the exception 
encompasses a variety of conduct.54 First, when a minor voluntarily answers 
questions asked by an officer, who is concerned with rescuing a victim, and the 
officer wishes to not impede his efforts to save the victim by giving the minor 
 
46. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79 (1966). 
47. Id. at 479–79.  
48. People v. Bradford, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 871–73 (1st Dist. 2008). 
49. Id. at 873.  
50. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. But see People v. Peevy, 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1187 (Cal. 1998) (finding 
voluntary statements admissible to “impeach the defendant’s credibility as a witness”); People v. Neal, 31 
Cal.4th 63, 78 (Cal. 2003) (finding a defendant’s statement “inadmissible for any purpose because” it was made 
involuntarily). 
51. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 627 (West 2016).  
52. Compare In re Patrick W., 104 Cal.App.3d 615, 617–18 (2nd Dist. 1980) (finding that extending 
Miranda to include a right to consult with a parent is not federally impermissible and holding that when the 
minor’s grandparents were at a nearby motel and available to speak to the minor, the police had a duty to inform 
the minor of his right to see them and to afford him the opportunity to do so before any interrogation occurred), 
with In re John S., 199 Cal.App.3d 441, 446 (6th Dist. 1988) (declining to follow In re Patrick W. because its 
holding departed from the holding in People v. Lara, where the “failure of police to seek the additional consent 
of a parent would not invalidate an otherwise valid waiver by a minor”). 
53. In re John S., 199 Cal.App.3d at 446.  
54. People v. Davis, 46 Cal.4th 539, 592, 208 P.3d 78, 121 (Cal. 2009); People v. Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 
76 (Cal. 2004); N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984); People v. Simpson, 65 Cal.App.4th 854, 841, 76 
Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 856 (4th Dist. 1998); People v. Cressy, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 240 (1st Dist. 1996). 
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Miranda warnings, the minor’s responses are admissible in court.55 Secondly, no 
warnings are required when an officer asks questions during an interrogation 
devoted to locate an abandoned deadly weapon out of concern for public safety.56 
Also, an officer may ask questions relating to the officer’s health or safety during 
an interrogation without giving Miranda warnings; for example, when an officer 
asks a suspect if he has any needles in his possession.57 
D. Assertion of Rights 
For a minor to invoke his constitutional rights, he is required to communicate 
this request in the same way an adult must do so.58 A minor must unambiguously 
request an attorney or communicate his desire to remain silent with such clarity 
that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would understand the minor’s 
request.59 Although words or conduct that show an unwillingness to 
communicate with law enforcement may invoke the right to remain silent,60 
complete silence alone is insufficient to invoke a minor’s right to remain silent.61 
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Villasenor found that a 17-
year-old invoked his right to remain silent after he repeatedly stated, “Just take 
me home.”62 In contrast, in People v. Roquemore, the same Court held that an 18-
year-old did not invoke his right to remain silent when he asked the arresting 
officer, “Can I call a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?”63 Additionally, in Fare 
v. Michael C., a minor requested the presence of his probation officer during any 
questioning, and the Supreme Court of the United States found that he 
insufficiently invoked his right to an attorney.64 These cases illustrate that 
minors, who are still developing cognitively, may lack the necessary 
communication skills to effectively invoke their rights or may lack the 
developmental maturity to understand the benefits associated with invoking these 
rights.65 
 
55. Davis, 208 P.3d at 121; Coffman, 96 P.3d at 76.  
56. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655–57; Simpson, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.  
57. Cressy, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d at 240. 
58. People v. Lessie, 47 Cal.4th 1152,1156, 223 P.3d 3, 5 (Cal. 2010). 
59. Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); People v. Soto, 204 Cal.Rptr. 204, 213 (2nd Dist. 1984).  
60. Soto, 204 Cal.Rptr. at 213. 
61. People v. Nelson, 266 P.3d 1008, 1016 (Cal. 2012); Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384. 
62. 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 796, 808 (3rd Dist. 2015). 
63. 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 214, 219 (2nd Dist. 2005). 
64. 442 U.S. 707, 723–24 (1979). 
65. See Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, KY. CHILD. RTS. 16 (1999) (stating the 
importance of conducting on a minor “[a]ssessments of cognitive, moral and identity development and 
childhood trauma, including an evaluation of the impact of immaturity on competence, can be useful” in 
determining the waiver of rights). 
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E. Sufficient Waiver 
The standard for a minor to waive his Miranda rights is the same standard 
applied to adults.66 A minor who wishes to waive his Miranda rights must waive 
them voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently for his waiver to be valid.67 
Generally, voluntariness depends on external factors, whereas both knowingly 
and intelligently depend on mental capacity.68 A court evaluating a minor’s 
waiver additionally considers factors such as the minor’s age, “intelligence, 
education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect” of 
making a statement.69 Also, a minor may invoke his Miranda rights after 
previously waiving them.70 
The prosecution71 carries the burden of establishing that a minor made a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.72 
A minor does not need to explicitly communicate to law enforcement that he 
wishes to waive his Miranda rights, but rather a minor can either expressly or 
implicitly waive these rights.73 A minor may make an implied waiver after he is 
fully advised and acknowledges his rights and decides to freely submit to 
questioning or makes a subsequent, un-coerced statement.74 Even if a minor fails 
to understand these rights and requests clarification, this does not amount to an 
invocation of his Miranda rights; instead, such a request can be used as evidence 
that the minor understood his rights and made a knowing and intelligent waiver.75 
In sum, without SB 1052, the procedure for a minor to invoke and waive his 
Miranda rights is essentially identical to adults.76 SB 1052 would have placed 
procedures on law enforcement designed to ensure that a minor meaningfully 
 
66. Fare, 442 U.S. at 724–25. 
67. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. 
68. Cox. v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 669, 675 (9th Cir. 2008). 
69. People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 383, 432 P.2d 202, 215 (Cal. 1967).; In re John S., 199 Cal.App.3d at 445.  
70. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
71. Prosecution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining prosecution as “[o]ne or more 
government attorneys who initiate and maintain a criminal action against an accused defendant”). 
72. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384; Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014) (defining preponderance of the evidence as “the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the jury is 
instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be”). 
73. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 (failing to specify a certain age where an implicit waiver is not 
applicable to a suspect); See Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (finding a defendant with an 11th grade education can 
implicitly waive their rights); Whitson, 949 P.2d at 28. 
74. See id.; see also, e.g., People v. Edwards, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 696, 731 (6th Dist. 2015) (finding a 17-
year-old minor to have “implicitly waived his rights” by voluntarily answering questions from law 
enforcement). 
75. People v. Bestelmeyer, 212 Cal.Rptr. 605, 609 (2nd Dist. 1985); People v. Maynarich, 147 Cal.Rptr. 
823, 826 (2nd Dist. 1978). 
76. Supra Part II.A–D. 
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understood and comprehended his constitutional rights before he either invoked 
or waived them.77 
III. SB 1052 
First, SB 1052 sought to make legislative declarations and findings regarding 
developmental and neurological science in terms of the interrogation of a 
minor.78 Second, SB 1052 attempted to add Section 625.6(a) to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code, requiring a minor to consult with legal counsel prior to a 
custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights.79 Finally, SB 
1052 sought to provide that a court determining the admissibility of a minor’s 
statement must consider law enforcement’s failure to comply with the Section 
625.6(a) requirement and provided an exception to the Section 625.5(a) 
requirement.80 
A. Legislative Declarations and Findings 
SB 1052 attempted to adopt findings from several Supreme Court cases81 by 
declaring that minors “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to 
recognize and avoid [detrimental] choices[,] . . . lack[ing] the capacity to exercise 
mature judgment.”82 Regarding police interrogations, SB 1052 further declared 
that minors “are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures” and to 
psychologically coercive interrogations than adults.83 By citing various studies, 
SB 1052 concluded that a minor’s thinking “tends to either ignore or discount 
future outcomes and implications, and disregard long-term consequences of 
important decisions,” resulting in a diminished ability to understand their rights 
and a waiver of those rights.84 
 
77. Infra Part III.B. 




81. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016) (citing J.D.B. v. N. C., 564 U.S. 261 (2011); Graham v. Fla., 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Eddings v. Okla., 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 707 (1979); 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966); Gallegos v. Colo., 370 U.S. 
49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)). 
82. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016) (quoting J.D.B., 564 U.S at 262). 
83. Id. 
84. See SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on 
Sept. 30, 2016) (relying on, e.g., Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay 
Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 28–44 (2009); William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescent’s AIDS Risk 
Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, 1990 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD AND DEV. 17, 25–26 (1990); Beyer, 
supra note 65, at 16; Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice 
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B. Mandatory Legal Consultation Before a Custodial Interrogation of a Minor 
SB 1052 would have enacted Section 625.6(a) of the Welfare and Institution 
Code85 requiring a minor to consult with legal counsel prior to a custodial 
interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda rights.86 A minor cannot 
waive such a consultation.87 Law enforcement may provide a minor with legal 
consultation either in person, by telephone, or by video conference.88 SB 1052, 
however, would not have applied to probation officers acting within their normal 
scope of duties.89 
SB 1052 further provided that a court determining the admissibility of a 
minor’s statement must consider law enforcement’s failure to comply with the 
Section 625.6(a) requirement when law enforcement conducts a custodial 
interrogation of a minor under 18-years-old prior to the minor consulting with 
legal counsel.90 Although law enforcement would have generally had to abide by 
the Section 625.6(a) requirement, exceptions applied.91 Section 625.6(c) would 
have exempted officers who reasonably believed the information he sought was 
necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat if the questions he 
asked were limited to those necessary to obtain that information.92 Under such 
circumstances, a minor would have been unable to benefit from the assistance of 
counsel prior to an interrogation or before waiving his rights.93 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court of California last addressed Miranda waivers by minors 
half a century ago, prior to emerging developmental and cognitive science.94 
Taking into account new developmental and cognitive science, SB 1052 would 
have changed the procedures for interrogating a minor to ensure the minor 
 
Advocates, NAT’L JUV. JUST. NETWORK (Sept. 2012), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Brain-
Development-Policy-Paper_Updated_FINAL-9-27-12.pdf [hereinafter Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates] 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach 
Decisions: Changes over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538, 541–42 (1981).  










94. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d at 4 (denying certiorari for a case regarding a ten-year-old minor waiving 
his Miranda rights). 
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comprehends his constitutional rights and the consequences of waiving those 
rights before being presented with the opportunity to invoke or waive them.95 
Part A of this section discusses how the Section 625.6(a) requirement would 
have afforded additional protections to minors to account for their developmental 
immaturity.96 Part B discusses the practicability of SB 1052’s new procedural 
requirements.97 Part C indicates how SB 1052 would have failed to add any new 
factors for courts to consider when determining if a minor made a knowing and 
intelligent statement and failed to provide significant guidance to courts 
addressing a minor’s unique developmental characteristics.98 Part D discusses 
how SB 1052 would have failed to assist minors in invoking their constitutional 
rights.99 Part E explains how SB 1052 would have granted a minor a new right 
without any remedy when violated.100 Part F provides an explanation of SB 
1052’s ultimate veto by Governor Brown.101 
A. SB 1052 Would Have Allowed Emerging Developmental and Cognitive 
Science to Influence Legal Standards 
Developmental studies show that a minor thinks in a fundamentally different 
manner than an adult.102 A minor’s frontal lobe, which regulates decision-
making, planning, judgement, and impulse control, drastically changes during his 
adolescent years and is the last part of the brain to fully develop.103 Additionally, 
minors fail to recognize alternative possibilities under stressful circumstances 
and tend to see only one way out of a problem, and are even willing to violate 
their own moral values as a result of their poor judgment.104 These 
characteristics, coupled with the environment of a coercive interrogation, may 
influence a minor to allegedly waive his constitutional rights when he do not 
meaningfully understand them, or worse, could result in a minor making a false 
confession.105 
 
95. Infra Part IV.A, C–D. 
96. Infra Part IV.A. 
97. Infra Part IV.B. 
98. Infra Part IV.C. 
99. Infra Part IV.D. 
100. Infra Part IV.E. 
101. Infra Part IV.F. 
102. Beyer, supra note 65, at 17. 
103. Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, supra note 84. 
104. Beyer, supra note 65, at 17. 
105. Compare In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (denying certiorari for a case regarding a ten-
year-old minor waiving his Miranda rights), with Drizin, supra note 17, at 919 (stating that “some individuals—
particularly. . . juveniles—are more vulnerable to the pressures of interrogation and therefore less likely to 
possess or be able to muster the physiological resources or perspective necessary to withstand accusatorial 
police questioning”), and In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. at 619 (Jefferson, J., concurring) (stating that it was 
an “erroneous assumption to couch a principle of law in terms that such a minor is capable of understanding the 
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For example, in 1980, a published study evaluated minors’ understanding of 
their Miranda rights.106 When asked to paraphrase their Miranda rights, only 
20.9 percent of minors demonstrated an adequate understanding, compared to 
42.3 percent of adults.107 Not only did 55.3 percent of the minors demonstrate a 
lack of understanding of at least one of the Miranda warnings, when assessed on 
their understanding of the vocabulary used in the Miranda warnings, only 33.2 
percent of the minors adequately understood the key words used, while 60.1 
percent of adults did.108 Also, 44.8 percent of the minors misunderstood their 
right to consult with an attorney prior to an interrogation or to have an attorney 
present during the interrogation, while only 14.6 percent of adults misunderstood 
this.109 Another study in 2011 found that age and intelligence predict a minor’s 
comprehension of the Miranda warnings, and that the younger minors with lower 
intelligence were the least likely to comprehend their Miranda rights and were 
the most likely to be overcome by law enforcement using negative feedback and 
pressure.110 This study found that 42.5 percent of the minors111 did not 
comprehend one of the Miranda warnings, and 44.7 percent failed to understand 
some of the vocabulary used in the Miranda warnings.112 
Despite this research, California courts regularly find minors, as young as 12-
years-old,113 capable of waiving their Miranda rights.114 At ten years old, Joseph 
was found to be capable of waiving his rights even though his understanding of 
his constitutional right to remain silent consisted of him being aware that he had 
the right to “remain calm.”115 However, in 1983, one California District court 
found a waiver invalid by a nine-year-old minor who purportedly waived his 
rights because the minor developmentally lacked the capability of legally 
waiving his rights.116 
 
constitutional rights involved in the Miranda warnings and in holding that he has the capacity to intelligently 
and knowingly waive such rights”). 
106. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. 




110. Kaitlyn McLachlan, Ronald Roesch & Kevin S. Douglas, Examining the Role of Interrogative 
Suggestibility in Miranda Rights Comprehension in Adolescents, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 170–71 (2011). 
111. This study consisted of 12–19 year olds. 
112. McLachlan et al., supra note 108, at 170–71.  
113. Nelson, 266 P.3d at 1019–20 (finding minors 15 years or older capable of waiving their Miranda 
rights); In re Anthony J., 166 Cal.Rptr. 238, 246 (1st Dist. 1980). 
114. In re Jessie L., 182 Cal.Rptr. 396, 404 (2nd Dist. 1982) (finding minors as young as 12 years old 
having the capabilities to understand their Miranda rights and the legal consequences of waiving them); In re 
Abdul Y., 183 Cal.Rptr. 146, 158 (3rd Dist. 1982); People v. Lewis, 28 P.3d 34, 69–70 (Cal. 2001); In re 
Charles P., 184 Cal.Rptr. 707, 709 (2nd Dist. 1982). 
115. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d at 3. 
116. In re Michael B., 197 Cal. Rptr. 379, 389 (5th Dist. 1983). 
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The Supreme Court of the United States treats minors different than adults in 
other aspects of the law due to developmental and cognitive research.117 For 
example, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court found it unconstitutional to sentence a 
minor to the death penalty.118 Additionally, in Graham v. Florida, the Court 
determined that sentencing a minor to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole, for committing a non-homicidal offense was unconstitutional.119 In Miller 
v. Alabama, by examining brain science, the Court found the mandatory sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole for a minor to be unconstitutional.120 
These cases demonstrate how new science and research can change how 
courts apply legal concepts to minors.121 SB 1052 would have facilitated this 
same kind of change by evaluating emerging science.122 Thus, by recognizing 
new research on a minor’s cognitive and developmental abilities, SB 1052 sought 
to protect minors from making unknowing or unintelligent statements when they 
do not understand their constitutional rights by giving them an opportunity to 
discuss these rights with an attorney prior to the interrogation of law 
enforcement.123 
B. SB 1052 Would Have Ensured a Minor Meaningfully Understands His 
Miranda Rights While Allowing Law Enforcement to Effectively Respond to 
Substantial Threats 
The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) opposed SB 1052 and 
argued that the bill would frustrate criminal investigations.124 Prior to SB 1052, 
law enforcement was required to advise a minor of his Miranda rights and his 
right to make at least two phone calls.125 Even under SB 1052, law enforcement 
was permitted to take a minor into custody without a warrant.126 However, SB 
 
117. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 568–69; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller v. Ala., 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012); 
J.B.D. v. N.C., 564 U.S. 261, 272–73 (2011). 
118. 543 U.S. at 568–69. 
119. 560 U.S. at 74. 
120. 32 S. Ct. at 2460 
121. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 568–69; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
122. Compare SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed 
on Sept. 30, 2016) (“People under 18 years of age have a lesser ability as compared to adults to comprehend the 
meaning of their rights and the consequences of waiver.”), with Simmons, 543 U.S. at 568–69 (finding that 
“scientific and sociological studies… tend to confirm ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often that in adults’”), and Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (finding that 
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds”), and Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (stating that “children are constitutionally different from adults”). 
123. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 6 (June 28, 
2016). 
124. Id. 
125. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 627 (West 2016); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
126. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
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1052 would have established a new procedure for law enforcement if they wish 
to interrogate a minor.127 
Under SB 1052, law enforcement would have been required to provide a 
minor a consultation with an attorney before a custodial interrogation or a waiver 
of his rights.128 Law enforcement may provide legal consultation either “in 
person, by telephone, or by video conference.”129 Such a requirement sought to 
prevent the Miranda warnings from becoming “merely a ritualistic recitation” 
and ensuring that a minor meaningfully understands his rights before having an 
opportunity to waive them.130 However, some states find the assistance of a 
minor’s parents is an adequate substitute for an attorney.131 Although a parent 
assisting a child may help with a minor’s understanding of his rights, the 
Supreme Court held that a parent cannot substitute the assistance of an 
attorney—who is the “one person to whom society as a whole looks as the 
protector of the [minor’s] legal rights.”132 Unlike a parent, an attorney is better 
suited to explain the constitutional rights a minor is entitled to and what types of 
legal consequences may accompany a waiver of these rights.133 
It is not entirely clear whether SB 1052’s Section 625.6(a) requirement 
would have slowed down the process to interrogate a minor, and it is unclear how 
such a requirement would have been efficiently implemented.134 Although SB 
1052 provided law enforcement with flexibility by allowing the consultation to 
be either “in person, by telephone or via video conference,”135 CDAA argued that 





130. Compare Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates supra note 84 (“The frontal lobe… is [the] 
‘executive’ part of the brain that regulates decision making, planning, judgment, expression of emotions, and 
impulse control.”), with ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 5 
(June 28, 2016) (“These procedures will prevent Miranda ‘warnings from becoming a merely ritualistic 
recitation wherein the effect of actual comprehension by the juvenile is ignored.’”). 
131. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(11) (West 2016) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger 
must have their parent waive their rights); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 2016) (stating that a 
minor’s parent or attorney must be present and informed of the minor’s rights for any custodial statement to be 
admissible but the minor and parent may waive parental presence in writing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
137 (West 2016) (stating that a minor’s statement made during custodial interrogation is inadmissible in 
juvenile court unless a parent is present and advised of the minor’s rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 
2016) (stating that a minor’s rights can be waived only by a parent or counsel unless the minor has been 
emancipated); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101(West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old cannot 
waive their Miranda rights unless a parent or attorney is present); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (West 
2016) (stating that the advisement of rights to a minor of 16 years or younger during a custodial interrogation 
must occur in the presence of a parent, guardian, or an attorney). 
132. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979)  
133. Id. (finding that a probation officer is not an adequate substitute for an attorney). 
134. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
135. Id. 
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them to comply with SB 1052.136 To support its position, CDAA states that a 
minor may make incriminating statements or give a confession when he is being 
transported to the police station, which would require an attorney to be present 
during this transportation for the officer to comply with SB 1052; even when the 
arresting officer planned to provide a consultation with an attorney.137 
An earlier version of SB 1052 could have potentially been interpreted to 
require an attorney to be readily available at all local police stations or an area 
designated to hold a juvenile awaiting an attorney.138 However, SB 1052 would 
have allowed law enforcement to provide legal counsel also by telephone or via 
video conference.139 Such alternatives to an in-person requirement provides law 
enforcement with the flexibility needed to adequately comply with Section 
625.6(a).140 Other state legislatures enacted similar legislation to SB 1052, 
illustrating that SB 1052’s consultation can practically be implemented.141 For 
example, the state of Indiana allows for the waiver of a minor’s rights only by a 
parent or counsel unless the minor has been emancipated.142 Even though SB 
1052 would have failed to address how its requirements would be specifically 
 
136. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 7 (June 28, 
2016). 
137. Id. 
138. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 7 (June 28, 
2016). 
139. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
140. Id. 
141. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-170 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 13 years old 
suspected of serious crimes must be read their Miranda rights and be represented by an attorney throughout the 
entire custodial process); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old 
cannot waive their right to an attorney “without the written consent” of a parent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-
331 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old can waive their rights only with the agreement of their 
parents and if their parent does not agree, the minor must consult with an attorney before they can waive their 
rights); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(F) (West 2016) (prohibiting the admission of a statement by a minor 
under 13 years old and presuming that a 13 or 14 year old minor is incapable of making a valid Miranda 
waiver); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(11) (West 2016) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger 
must have their parent waive their rights); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 2016) (stating that a 
minor’s parent or attorney must be present and informed of the minor’s rights for any custodial statement to be 
admissible but the minor and parent may waive parental presence in writing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
137 (West 2016) (stating that a minor’s statement made during custodial interrogation is inadmissible in 
juvenile court unless a parent is present and advised of the minor’s rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 
2016) (stating that a minor’s rights can be waived only by a parent or counsel unless the minor has been 
emancipated);  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101(West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old cannot 
waive their Miranda rights unless a parent or attorney is present); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (West 
2016) (stating that the advisement of rights to a minor of 16 years or younger during a custodial interrogation 
must occur in the presence of a parent, guardian, or an attorney). 
142. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 2016) (stating that a minor’s rights can be waived only by a 
parent or counsel unless the minor has been emancipated). 
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implemented,143 other states show the ability of law enforcement to implement 
similar requirements and provide different procedural safeguards for minors.144 
Additionally, law enforcement would not be impeded by such a requirement 
under circumstances where a minor’s statement is “necessary to protect life or 
property from a substantial threat.”145 SB 1052 would have allowed law 
enforcement to forego the Section 625.6(a) requirement when the questioning of 
a minor is necessary to protect a person’s life or property from a substantial 
threat.146 Under these circumstances, law enforcement would not be required to 
provide a minor with a consultation with an attorney, nor would law enforcement 
even be required to advise the minor of his Miranda rights.147 By allowing law 
enforcement to ignore the Section 625.6(a) requirement, SB 1052 would have 
allowed the needs of society to overcome the needs of a minor when a minor’s 
statement may mitigate a substantial threat to society.148 SB 1052 attempted to 
craft a fair balance between the developmental needs of a minor and the need of 
law enforcement to quickly respond to an imminent threat.149 
C. SB 1052 Would Have Failed to Provide Guidance to a Court Determining 
Whether a Statement was Voluntarily, Knowingly, and Intelligently Made  
SB 1052 would not have provided guidance to a court determining whether a 
minor’s statements were voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made; 
however, the original version of SB 1052 would have expressed to courts the 
type of factors to consider in making its determination.150 Section 1 discusses the 
original version of SB 1052, which included additional factors that courts were 
required to consider when determining whether a minor’s made a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent statement.151 Section 2 discusses how SB 1052 would 
have left the currently vague framework in place when courts determined a 
minor’s waiver.152 
 
143. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
144. § 31-32-5-1 (stating that a minor’s rights can be waived only by a parent or counsel unless the minor 
has been emancipated). 
145. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
146. Id. 
147. Id.; Davis, 208 P.3d at 121; Coffman, 96 P.3d at 76; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655–56; Simpson, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 856; see also Cressy, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240 (stating that “the Supreme Court indicated that the 
safety of officers was a valid consideration under the “public safety” exception”). 
148. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
149. Id. 
150. Compare id.  (listing no factors for the court to consider), with SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 
Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted) (listing 13 factors for the court to consider). 
151. Infra Part IV C.1 
152. Infra Part IV.C.2. 
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1. SB 1052s Original Version Provided Guidance to Courts 
A prior version of SB 1052 required a court to consider the failure of law 
enforcement to comply with Section 625.6(a), as well as several other additional 
factors, when determining if a minor’s admission, statement, or confession were 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made under SB 1052.153 These included, 
but were not limited to, the following types of factors: (1) the minor’s personal, 
physical, and cognitive characteristics; (2) the capacity of the minor to 
understand the complexities of his Miranda rights; (3) the manner the minor was 
advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the procedures taken and behavior of law 
enforcement prior to and during the interrogation; (5) the manner in which the 
interrogation occurred; (6) the minor’s criminal history; (7) whether the minor 
made an express or implied waiver; and (8) the minor’s behavior and requests 
made during the interrogation.154 
2. Subsequent Amendments to SB 1052 Leave the Vague Framework Courts 
Have when Determining when a Statement is Voluntarily, Knowingly, 
and Intelligently Made  
When law enforcement fails to provide a minor with a consultation prior to 
interrogating them, a court must determine whether the minor’s subsequent 
statement were voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.155 Prior to SB 
1052, a court evaluated the totality of the circumstances to determine if a 
statement was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, including the 
details of the interrogation and the characteristics of the minor.156 These 
characteristics included the minor’s age, intelligence, education, and 
experience.157 SB 1052 would not have changed what factors a court evaluates 
and failed to provide courts specific guidance when tasked with the responsibility 
of determining the admissibility of a minor’s statements.158 A prior version of SB 
1052 provided courts with the necessary guidance to evaluate a waiver of a 
minor’s rights, even though courts retained the discretion to evaluate other 
factors and assign the weight of each in its determination.159 
First, SB 1052’s prior version provided clearer and more specific factors than 
case law in terms of a minor’s age by requiring a court to consider the minor’s 
 
153. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
154. Id. 
155. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
156. People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 383, 432 P.2d 202, 215 (Cal. 1967); In re John S., 199 Cal.App.3d at 
445. 
157. Lara, 67 Cal.2d at 383, 432 P.2d at 215; In re John S., 199 Cal.App.3d at 445. 
158. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
159. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
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maturity, physical, mental, and emotional health.160 Such clarity indicates to a 
court that it must look to all of the circumstances of the minor’s life to determine 
the minor’s level of maturity and cognitive health when he made statements, 
rather than relying on an over-generalization of a person’s age.161 For example, 
cognitive and developmental research shows that two minors at the same age can 
be in completely different developmental stages, resulting in varying levels of 
maturity.162 These factors required a court to conduct an individual, specific 
evaluation of the minor in light of the fact that brain development, especially the 
“frontal lobes, responsible for mature thought, reasoning and judgement,” 
continues early in a minor’s life and into adulthood.163 
Second, SB 1052’s prior version provided factors that required a court to not 
only determine the general intelligence of a minor, but also to determine the 
minor’s level of intelligence in association with the Miranda rights.164 This is a 
significant inquiry if a minor is found to meaningfully waive his rights, given 
new cognitive scientific research “show[ing] that the capacity of youth to grasp 
legal rights is less than that of an adult” and also since minors “frequently lack 
the ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions.”165 
Third, SB 1052’s prior version presented factors to evaluate the type of 
behavior and procedures used by law enforcement, which could produce an 
involuntary statement when a minor is placed in certain circumstances.166 These 
included the number of officers present, the amount of time the interrogation 
took, and the tone and manner of the questioning, all which are known to induce 
a minor into providing a false confession.167 Another factor included whether an 
officer prevented a parent from speaking to a minor prior to an interrogation or 
whether an officer made promises, such as promising that the minor could leave 
or that he would receive leniency.168 These are important factors to be considered 
when evaluating a minor’s waiver since cognitive research indicates that minors 
are more susceptible than adults to pressure from authority figures.169 
The additional factors that SB 1052’s prior version introduced were 
previously available for examination by a court and are currently still available; 
however, by explicitly requiring a court to consider them, SB 1052 would have 




162.  Beyer, supra note 65, at 16. 
163. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 4 (June 28, 2016). 
164. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
165. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 3–4 (June 28, 
2016). 
166. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
167. Drizin, supra note 17, at 919. 
168. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
169. Beyer, supra note 65, at 16. 
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waived his Miranda rights by considering the internalities and externalities 
unique to minors in the interrogation room.170 By removing such guidance, 
SB 1052 would have created the risk that courts would continue to use the vague 
legal framework and failed to consider the unique susceptibility of minors in 
interrogation rooms.171 
D. SB 1052 Would Have Failed to Assist a Minor in Meeting the Stringent 
Requirement to Adequately Invoke His Rights 
Minors are required to invoke their Miranda rights in the same manner as an 
adult,172 and even when law enforcement fails to provide a minor a consultation 
with an attorney, the minor’s statements may still be admissible in court.173 
However, an early version of SB 1052 would have required the court to provide 
the jury with an instruction that advised them to view any statements made by a 
minor with caution when law enforcement failed to provide a consultation with 
an attorney.174 CDAA argued that this requirement “cast[ed] doubt upon 
voluntary confessions introduced at trial,” and that additional protections already 
exist to prevent the use of unlawfully obtained confessions.175 However, SB 1052 
and the CDAA do not address the concern that minors, who lack the same 
experience, knowledge, and resources as an adult, are held by courts to the same 
standard required to invoke their rights as an adult.176 A minor must invoke his 
rights unambiguously with such clarity that a reasonable officer under the 
circumstances would understand the minor’s request to exercise his rights.177 
Requests made by minors to either talk to their mom, dad, or probation officer 
are insufficiently unambiguous to invoke their right to remain silent.178 In light of 
emerging developmental and cognitive science, this language may have been the 
only communication skills the minor developmentally possessed capable of 
stating that he wanted the assistance of an attorney or an authority figure.179 A 
 
170. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
171. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 6 (June 28, 
2016). 
172. People v. Lessie, 47 Cal.4th 1152,1156, 223 P.3d 3, 5 (Cal. 2010). 
173. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
174. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
175. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1052, at 6 (June 28, 
2016). 
176. Lessie, 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1156, 223 P.3d at 5. 
177. Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); People v. Soto, 204 Cal.Rptr. 204, 213; Lessie, 223 P.3d at 5, 14. 
178. People v. Roquemore, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 214, 219 (2d Dist. 2005); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 
723–24 (1979). 
179. Compare Beyer, supra note 65, at 16 (stating the importance of conducting on a minor 
“[a]ssessments of cognitive, moral and identity development and childhood trauma, including an evaluation of 
the impact of immaturity on competence, can be useful” in determining the waiver of rights), with Roquemore, 
31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 224 (holding that “[d]efendant’s subsequent statement that he was confused and “[C]an I call 
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jury instruction would have warned the jury to find that a minor did, in fact, 
desire to remain silent or to consult with counsel at a time when case law holds a 
stringent requirement that may run contrary to the developmental capabilities of 
minors.180 
Cautioning a jury that a minor may lack the sophisticated communication 
skills necessary to request the assistance of counsel or that a minor demonstrated 
an unwillingness to speak puts the jury in a position to determine if any 
subsequent statements were unreliable or involuntary.181 Such an additional 
safeguard could have helped reduce the amount of convictions due to false 
confessions made by minors.182 Even prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court of the 
United States previously stated that an “admission and confession of [a minor] 
require[s] special caution” because a minor can be an “easy victim of the law.”183 
In sum, although SB 1052 would have addressed the concern of whether a minor 
meaningfully understood his Miranda rights, SB 1052 would have failed to 
address case law decisions holding that minors must invoke their rights to the 
same “unambiguous” standard as adults.184 Providing a jury instruction to the 
jury to view un-consulted statements with caution could have provided an 
additional safeguard.185 
 
a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?” did not constitute an unequivocal request for counsel to be present”), and 
Fare, 442 U.S. at 723–24 (declining “to find that the request for the probation officier is tantamount to a request 
for an attorney”). See In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. 3d at 619 (Jefferson, J., concurring) (stating that the 
California Constitution should be interpreted to preclude the application of a Miranda waiver to any minor who 
is not more than 13 years of age). 
180. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459–60 (rejecting to require interrogations to cease when an ambiguous 
request of counsel is made and finding the Miranda warnings to be the primary protection in a custodial 
interrogation). 
181. See SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not 
enacted) (advising the jury to view statements made in a custodial interrogation with caution). 
182.  Compare id. (listing one of the factors as “[w]hether the youth asked to speak with a parent or other 
adult at any time while in law enforcement custody”), with Drizin, supra note 17, at 919 (stating that “some 
individuals—particularly… juveniles—are more vulnerable to the pressures of interrogation and therefore less 
likely to possess or be able to muster the physiological resources or perspective necessary to withstand 
accusatorial police questioning”). 
183. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967). 
184. Compare SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed 
on Sept. 30, 2016) (containing no language that would require the fact finder to consider the statements made by 
the minor), with Roquemore, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d at 224 (holding that “[d]efendant’s subsequent statement that he 
was confused and “[C]an I call a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?” did not constitute an unequivocal request 
for counsel to be present”), and Fare, 442 U.S. at 723–24 (declining “to find that the request for the probation 
officer is tantamount to a request for an attorney”). 
185. Compare SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but 
not enacted) (stating that jury instructions shall advise that “statements made in custodial interrogation in 
violation” §625.6(a) “shall be viewed with caution”), with Lara, 432 P.2d at 219 (holding “that a minor, even of 
subnormal mentality, does not lack the capacity as a matter of law to make a voluntary confession without the 
presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, or to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his 
right to counsel at trial”). 
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E. SB 1052 Grants Minors a New Right, While Failing to Provide a Remedy 
SB 1052 would have required law enforcement to provide a minor a 
consultation with legal counsel before a custodial interrogation or a waiver of 
rights.186 If law enforcement failed to provide such a consultation, a court 
determining the admissibility of the minor’s statement would have had to 
consider the failure to comply with Section 625.6(a) requirement.187 Even if law 
enforcement completely failed to comply with the Section 625.6(a), the minor’s 
statement could still be admissible in court if made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.188 
Unlike SB 1052, when an officer fails to provide a minor with the Miranda 
warnings, absent any exception, any subsequent statements made during an in-
custody interrogation are inadmissible in court.189 Additionally, under the 
exclusionary rule,190 when law enforcement obtains evidence by conducting 
searches or seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, such evidence is 
inadmissible in court.191 The exclusionary rule and Miranda deters law 
enforcement from failing to follow the Fourth and Fifth Amendment by 
“remov[ing] the incentive to disregard it” by not allowing the use of evidence 
obtained in violation of them.192 
The exclusionary rule would not have applied to SB 1052.193 SB 1052 would 
have failed to require the inadmissibility of a minor’s statement made in violation 
of Section 625.6(a), but rather stated that it would only be a factor considered by 
courts.194 SB 1052 would have created no incentive for law enforcement to 
comply with the Section 625.6(a) requirement.195 By doing so, SB 1052 would 
 
186. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
187. Id. 
188. Compare id. (“The court shall in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 
years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply” with 
§625.6(a).), with Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (finding “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation” of the rights 
conveyed in the warnings “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”), and Lara, 
432 P.2d at 215 (holding “that a minor, even of subnormal mentality, does not lack the capacity as a matter of 
law to make a voluntary confession without the presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, or to 
make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel at trial”). 
189. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966)  
190. Exclusionary Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), Westlaw (defining exclusionary 
rule as “a rule that excludes or suppresses evidence obtained in violation of an accused person’s constitutional 
rights”). 
191. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 634 (1961)  
192. Id.at 656. 
193. See id. at 657 (stating that the exclusionary rule applies to a violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution). 
194. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
195. Compare id. (“The court shall in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 
years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply” with 
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have granted minors a new procedural right, but would have failed to provide a 
remedy.196 Law enforcement could have completely ignored the Section 625.6(a) 
requirement, absent the exception, and statements made by a minor would have 
potentially still been admissible in court.197 To prevent abuse from law 
enforcement, SB 1052 should have required that any statement obtained in 
violation of Section 625.6(a), absent the exception, be inadmissible in court, thus  
“remov[ing] the incentive to disregard it”.198 
F. SB 1052’s Veto 
As of September 30, 2016, SB 1052 passed both houses of the California 
Legislature.199 However, Governor Brown returned SB 1052 without his 
signature, preventing SB 1052 from becoming law.200 Although recognizing that 
minors “are more vulnerable than adults and easily succumb to police pressure to 
talk instead of remaining silent,” Governor Brown found the potential effects on 
law enforcement efforts required further investigation before the imposition of 
the Section 625.6(a) requirement.201 As a consensus, emerging cognitive and 
developmental research illustrates the inequality of imposing an adult standard on 
minors when they are interrogated.202 Although Governor Brown was unprepared 
to accept SB 1052’s attempt to balance the needs of minors and the needs of law 
enforcement, California, through its Legislature, expressed its willingness to 
follow the path of other states.203 
V. CONCLUSION 
SB 1052 is a direct result of the judicial system’s unwillingness to address a 
minor’s ability to meaningfully waive his constitutional rights.204 The Supreme 
 
§625.6(a).), with Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657 (stating that the exclusionary rule applies to a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution). 
196. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
197. Id. 
198. Compare id. (“The court shall in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth under 18 
years of age made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply” with 
§ 625.6(a).), with Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656-57 (stating that the exclusionary rule applies to a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution), and Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (“The 
warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully 
effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.”). 
199. Hearing on SB 1052 Before the Senate Rules Committee, Leg., 2015-2016 Sess., 4 (Cal. 2016). 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. See infra Part IV.A. 
203. See Hearing on SB 1052 Before the Senate Rules Committee, Leg., 2015-2016 Sess., 4 (Cal. 2016). 
204. Compare SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but 
not enacted) (“In the determination of whether a child or youth has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
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Court of California addressed this issue almost a half a century ago before 
emerging research in developmental and cognitive science.205 Senator Lara 
drafted SB 1052 to answer Justice Liu’s call for the Legislature to act when the 
Supreme Court of California decided to not address Joseph’s ability to effectively 
waive his rights.206 SB 1052 sought to ensure that a minor actually comprehends 
his constitutional rights, while striking a fair balance to provide law enforcement 
with the ability to prevent substantial harm to a person or property.207 
Although the Section 625.6(a) requirement may have inconvenienced law 
enforcement, a waiver is still only valid if voluntarily, intelligently, and 
knowingly made.208 SB 1052 would have ensured that this legal concept is 
meaningfully applied to a minor by requiring that he consult with an attorney 
before he can invoke or waive his rights.209 Other state legislatures enacting 
similar legislation demonstrate the ability to effectively implement SB 1052’s 
consultation requirement.210 SB 1052, however, would have failed to protect a 
minor lacking the communication skills to effectively invoke his constitutional 
rights.211 For a minor in this circumstance, who is not provided a consultation 
 
waived his or her rights under Miranda… a court must take into account the special concerns that are present 
when a young person is involved, including a child or youth’s limited experience, education and immature 
judgment.”), with In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d at 4–5 (“Many states have found the issue worthy of legislative 
action”). 
205. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d at 4–5. 
206. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
207. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
208. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. 
209. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
30, 2016). 
210. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-170 (West 2016 ) (stating that a minor under 13 years old 
suspected of serious crimes must be read their Miranda rights and represented by an attorney throughout the 
entire custodial process); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old 
cannot waive their right to an attorney “without the written consent” of a parent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-
331 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old can waive their rights only with the agreement of their 
parents and if their parent does not agree, the minor must consult with an attorney before they can waive their 
rights); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-14(F) (West 2016) (prohibiting the admission of a statement by a minor under 
13 years old and presumes that a 13 or 14 year old minor is incapable of making [14] a valid Miranda waiver); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(11) (West 2016) (stating that a minor 12 years old or younger must have 
their parent waive their rights); REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 2016) (stating that a minor’s parent or 
attorney must be present and informed of the minor’s rights for any custodial statement to be admissible but the 
minor and parent may waive parental presence in writing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-137 (West 2016) 
(stating that a minor’s statement made during custodial interrogation is inadmissible in juvenile court unless a 
parent is present and advised of the minor’s rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 2016) (stating that a 
minor’s rights can be waived only by a parent or counsel unless the minor has been emancipated);  N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101(West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old cannot waive their Miranda rights 
unless a parent or attorney is present); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (West 2016) (stating that the 
advisement of rights to a minor of 16 years or younger during a custodial interrogation must occur in the 
presence of a parent, guardian, or an attorney). 
211. Compare SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed 
on Sept. 30, 2016) (listing no factors for the court to consider), with SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 
2016) (as amended on March 28, 2016, but not enacted) (listing 13 factors for the court to consider). 
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with an attorney, SB 1052 would have added no further factors for a court 
evaluating his statement and failed to provide guidance to a court considering the 
minor’s unique developmental and cognitive ability.212 Such guidance would 
have supplemented the currently vague legal framework to determine whether a 
minor made a valid waiver.213 Additionally, SB 1052 would have failed to 
provide any significant remedy when law enforcement failed to comply with the 
Section 625.6(a) requirement.214 Requiring the inadmissibility of any statements 
made in violation of Section 625.6, SB 1052 would have provided law 
enforcement with the incentive to abide by it.215 As indicated by Governor 
Brown, “[t]here is much to be done.”216 
 
212. SB 1052, Leg. 2016, 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as enrolled on Sept. 2, 2016, but vetoed on Sept. 
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with Miranda, Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (“The warnings required and the waiver necessary in 
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